Is Christian Belief Rational?
What the Philosophers
Are Saying
by Michael L. Peterson
I. God's Comeback in Philosophy

A. Renewed Interest in Christianity
In April 1980 Time magazine reported that "God is making a
comeback . . . in the crisp, intellectual circles of academic
philosophers." The article surveys the quiet revolution in thinking
which is currently taking place in philosophy. During the early part
of this century, such philosophies as naturalism, positivism,
empiricism, and existentialism gained widespread allegiance among
professional philosophers. Unfortunately, these philosophies tend to
view belief in God as either false or lacking in rational support.
Roderick Chisholm from the Ivy League Brown University explains
that this view has been so influential because "the brightest people"
held it for years. However, Chisholm adds in recent years a number
of "tough-minded" intellectuals have provided defense for religious
belief, and have ushered the topic of God back into fruitful discourse.
Most of them have a specific interest in the God of Christianity.
Whereas it used to be thought irrational to believe in God, now
many philosophers are claiming it is entirely rational. Of course, no
genuine issue in philosophy is ever finally settled. Philosophers are
forever trying to shed new light on enduring problems, and the same
is true for the pro bl em of whether Christian belief is rational or not. I
propose to take a look at what philosophers have been saying about
this precise problem. The issue of religious belief is obviously very
large and complex, so I will focus on just a few aspects of the overall
problem.
Michael L. Peterson is associate professor of Philosophy and
head of the Department of Philosophy at Asbury College,
Wilmore, KY.
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B. The Structure of this Essay
The issue of whether belief in God is rational has been approached
in a number of different ways. One way is offering proofs or
arguments for and against God's existence. Such arguments are
taken to be the rational basis for either belief or disbelief in God.
Those thinkers who believe the arguments for God's existence win
out form the tradition of natural theology down through the
centuries. Other thinkers who believe the arguments against God's
existence tip the scales form the enterprise which we may call natural
atheology. (At least this label is more charitable than calling it
unnatural theology.) Our Christian heritage is greatly indebted to
those who have tackled these kinds of problems, and I personally
owe much of my own Christian position to their work.
However, there is another way of approaching the question of
whether belief in God is rational - a way which provides a stimulus
for what I have to say. This second approach does not deal directly
with the various grounds on which belief in God can be called
rational. Instead it deals with the very standard of rationality by
which such grounds are judged. Philosophers have offered a number
of proposals for conditions which must be met in order for a belief to
be rational. I will discuss two of these proposals and try to determine
whether Christian belief is rational according to these requirements.
The two requirements, which are distinct but closely related are: (I)
A person may hold a belief only on the basis of having responsibly
reviewed the relevant evidence; and (2) A belief must have sufficient
evidence. The first condition pertains to the relationship between the
person doing the believing and the proposition he believes. The
second regards the relationship between the proposition believed and
the evidence for or against it.

C. Preliminary Distinctions
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify exactly what aspect of
Christian belief is being analyzed. As the title states, Christian belief
is the general concern, but this is a vast subject which entails a
number of interrelated beliefs. Therefore, this article will be
restricted specifically to the question of belief in God. To center on
belief in God is not to study any particular Christian doctrines as
such, even though the validity of Christian doctrines is a fascinating
issue in itself. However, it is discussed indirectly here, since belief in
God is the foundation of all other doctrines. And belief in God is
4
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logically necessary to orthodox Christianity. Unless belief in God is
defensible, Christianity is not defensible.
For present purposes, to talk about belief in God is to talk about
the belief that God exists, i.e., the belief that the proposition "God
exists" is true. Obviously, believing in God involves more than
accepting a certain proposition as true. Belief in God in the full sense
includes trusting God, committing one's life to Him, and living
within His presence. But, if belief in God is more than acceptance of a
proposition, then it is at least that. One cannot sensibly commit one's
life to God, or thank God, or praise God without believing that there
is such a person as God. Hebrews 11 :6 suggests this very idea. Hence,
belief that God exists is fundamental to belief in God. And unless
belief that God exists is defensible, trust in and commitment to God
is not defensible.
Having made the above points, I shall use the terms "Christian
belief" and "religious belief" synonymously with "belief in God."
Also I shall use "belief in God" interchangeably with "belief that God
exists." The exact question I wish to address, then, is whether belief
in God - belief in the existence of God - is rational.
II. Rationality and the Ethics of Belief (first criticism)

A. Intellectual Duties
We are familiar with the accusation that religious belief is
rationally deficient or defective. Critics have made this accusation
from two somewhat different perspectives. One perspective is
religious believers have neglected the responsibility of scrutinizing
and evaluating their beliefs in light of the evidence. The other
perspective is the objective evidence itself, regardless of whether
believers have been conscientious about it or not, just shows that
God does not exist. According to either perspective, belief in God is
plainly irrational. Let us examine the first way of criticizing religious
belief in this section and reply to it in the next. Also, let us reserve
consideration of the second criticism for subsequent sections.
The first formulation of the irrationality criticism exhibits an
underlying conviction that there is an ethical responsibility which
attaches to the human enterprise of believing. Ethically speaking, we
have no right simply to believe anything whatever. We have the
ethical duty to try to reach or approximate the truth. W.K. Clifford,
a 19th century philosopher, tells a story to accent this fundamental
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requirement:
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He
knew that she was old, and not over-well built at the first;
that she had seen many seas and climes, and often had
needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that
possibly she was not seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon
his mind, and made him unhappy; he thought that perhaps
he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted,
even though this should put him to great expense. Before the
ship sailed, however, he succeeded in overcoming these
melancholy reflections. He said to himself that she had gone
safely through so many voyages and weathered many storms
and that it was idle to suppose she would not come safely
home from this trip also. He would put his trust in
Providence, which could hardly fail to protect all these
unhappy families that were leaving their fatherland to seek
for better times elsewhere. He would dismiss from his mind
all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders and
contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and
comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe
and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart,
and benevolent wishes for the success of the exiles in their
strange new home that was to be; and he got his insurancemoney when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.
Clifford asks rhetorically, "What shall we say of the shipowner?"
Clearly, we shall say, "He is guilty of the death of those people."

B. The Importance of Sufficient Evidence
Granted, the shipowner sincerely believed in the soundness of the
ship, or so we are told in the hypothetical story. But he believed in a
manner which violates the ethics of the intellectual life. Actually, the
shipowner had "no right to believe on such evidence as was before
him." He had acquired his belief by stifling doubts and avoiding
careful investigation. Clifford correctly indicates that even if we alter
the story a bit and suppose the ship was not unsound after all, the
shipowner is still as guilty as before. The question of right or wrong
here does not have to do with the actual truth or falsity of the belief,
but with the way in which the belief is attained and held. John Stuart
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Mill made this same point in his classic essay, On Liberty. Mill states
the truth may reside in the mind as a prejudice, or a superstition, and
this is beneath the dignity of a rational being. A belief, even a true
belief, may be acquired in the wrong way - not because it is
responsibly evaluated and seen as true.
According to the "ethics of belief" theorists, then, a belief ought to
be held only on the basis of having found sufficient evidence. And the
strength with which we hold any belief ought to be in proportion to
the strength of the evidence. Presumably, if one is too busy or too
untrained to investigate the grounds of a belief, then his proper
attitude ought to be something like neutrality. As Clifford eloquently
says, "Every time we let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we
weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, of judicially and
fairly weighing evidence." An ethic of belief, therefore, is a procedure
for guarding_ the mind from error and credulity.

C. The Indictment of Religious Belief
It is now quite easy to explain the kind of criticism of religious
belief which is based on the ethics of belief. The critic says the believer
is in violation of the moral requirements placed on believing, or the
believer has adopted certain theological propositions without
carefully examining the evidence for and against them. In a sense,
this criticism is directed against the religious believer in his role as a
believer, and not against what he believes per se.
III. Is the Religious Believer in Violation of the Ethics of Belief? (first
reply)

A. Giving the Critic His Due
What can be said in response to the critic who says the religious
believer has violated or neglected the ethical conditions of believing?
Has the believer failed to examine the evidence carefully and
conform his belief conscientiously to it? Has he become so careless in
his mental habits that he has fallen victim to wishful thinking, peer
pressure, propaganda, or some other subrational force? The first part
of our response to such questions should be to give the critic his
proper due. The critic should be applauded for endorsing a general
ethics of belief. Human beings are not totally free to believe just
anything they choose. As responsible, rational, and moral agents, we
must adjust our beliefs to the best reasons and evidence available.
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The morality of our believing something is determined largely by our
honest and energetic efforts to analyze the evidence, even if we are
sometimes mistaken.
The critic also seems to be correct in indicating that some religious
believers are credulous people, defending themselves by saying their
religious beliefs are private matters without any rational or ethical
constraints. It's no wonder thoughtful nonbelievers sometimes
characterize believers as persons who believe on fancy, push away
doubts, and direct their minds toward the comfortable and familiar.
Now, after giving the critic his due, what can be said in stronger
defense of the rationality of religious belief? Two important defenses
are in order: (I) We must point out a host of technical difficulties
involved in formulating an exact ethics of belief, and we must
emphasize that not all believers are out of the spirit of such a code
anyway; and (2) We must insist that the critic is operating on the
single principle of avoiding error while religious belief may be
governed more by the additional principle of finding truth. Let us
develop these defenses in more detail.

B. Difficulties in Formulating the Ethics of Belief
While it is quite legitimate to call for responsibility in believing, it
is very difficult to formulate a clear criterion for fulfilling that
responsibility. One problem arises with respect to the notion of
sufficient evidence. Many philosophers say the ethics of belief
require us to believe a proposition only on sufficient evidence.
Supposedly, every meaningful proposition is capable of being
justified or refuted by appropriate evidence. Yet spelling out the
exact kind and amount of evidence which would be sufficient in any
given case is a formidable task. For example, what kinds of evidence
are relevant to theological propositions, and particularly to the
proposition that God exists? Does pure intellectual argumentation
count? Does personal experience or insight count? Do historical
events count? Precisely what sort of evidence is valid so that one who
considers the proposition "God exists" is ethically obliged to take
account of it?
To continue this line of questioning, how much evidence is
sufficient or enough to justify any given proposition? How does one
tell when the evidence he possesses is indeed sufficient? Obviously,
there are times when one has an overwhelming amount of evidence
for a belief or an overwhelming amount against it. But how do we
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specify the exact point at which the evidence becomes sufficient?
What about one who conscientiously thinks that he has sufficient
evidence and yet is mistaken? Who has the prerogative of setting up
this criterion of sufficiency anyway?
The questions above reveal difficulties in articulating a precise
code of ethics for believing. We can endorse the basic value of being
concerned for evidence, but we cannot specify a formula for when
this value has been properly displayed. Therefore, the moral
evaluation of whether someone has done his intellectual duty, in
conforming his belief to the evidence, is in the realm of fallible
judgment and not in the realm of exact calculation. This means there
is room for difference of opinion regarding the ethics of belief. In
fact, we might add part of the general ethics of belief which we are
discussing includes, not only evidential scrupulosity but, intellectual
humility and tolerance as well. Without these other equally
important intellectual virtues, the search after truth (which the critic
wants to protect) is simply jeopardized in other ways.
The moral here is that no one can dictate the precise point at which
another person has weighed the evidence responsibly and is therefore
entitled to believe. As long as a person makes a serious attempt to be
reasonable and honest in his belief, we should be cautious about
pronouncing him to be in violation of intellectual ethics. Thus the
critic does not really possess a strict and absolute standard of ethics
according to which the religious believer is clearly out of order.
Furthermore, in spite of the difficulties surrounding a precise code
of ethics of belief, many religious believers take great care to accord
with the basic spirit of such an ethic. Not only do many lay believers
want to be as reasonable as their ability permits, there is a whole
tradition of Christian scholarship which has produced impressive
reasons for belief in God. Therefore, the critic cannot justly make a
blanket indictment that the religious believer is irrational because he
has violated the ethics of belief.

C. The Neglected Duty to Truth
We have examined the critic's objection that Christians violate the
ethics of belief. We have begun to see that a number of believers
actually exhibit the intellectual virtue of reasonableness. But the discussion so far has been dominated by only one aspect of intellectual
ethics - the duty to avoid error. There is another duty of the
intellectual life - the duty to find truth. I think believers may find an
9
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important method of rebuff for the critic by exploring this second
duty.
Initially, we must emphasize that these two duties are genuinely
distinct. They are not just two ways of expressing the same duty. To
fulfill one may not be to fulfill the other. All responsible thinkers
must face the question of which of these twin duties has priority in
case of conflict, for it will make a great deal of difference in how they
operate in the realm of belief. W.K. Clifford, for example,
emphasizes the avoidance of error and warns against believing
anything without sufficient evidence. Clifford feels pathos when he
says that an error or falsehood, once believed, is like a pestilence
which can "master one's body and then spread to the rest of the
town." Then he asks, "What would be thought of one who, for the
sake of a sweet fruit, should deliberately run the risk of bringing a
plague upon his family and his neighbors?" Clifford's point is
permeated by the fear of error, which offsets the desire for truth.
My question for Clifford and the Cliffordians is, "Are there not
situations in which the chance of gaining truth outweighs the risk of
error?" When one is sifting through the evidence for and against a
contemplated belief, there may be no magical signal that he has
acquired enough of the right kind of evidence and is therefore
entitled to believe. One simply has to weigh the evidence to the best of
his ability and then make a judgment to give or to withhold assent. If
the desire or need for truth is strongly present, even when the
evidence is not compelling, it is plausible to think that a person might
go ahead and believe.
Going ahead and believing is even more plausible if one assesses
the risk factor differently from Clifford. Clifford seems to assume
that if one refrains from believing on insufficient evidence he has
eliminated the risk of error. This assumption, however, is not correct.
The risk of gaining or losing truth, or of embracing or avoiding error,
is present regardless of what attitude one adopts toward a
proposition - whether he positively believes, positively disbelieves,
or remains neutral. The Cliffordian insistence on sufficient evidence,
well-motivated though it is, is hardly effective in eliminating risk.
We can even envision special situations in which the proposition
being considered for belief is so important that the Cliffordian code
cannot give adequate guidance at all. We might imagine a situation in
which the importance of finding truth is quite great, even though the
evidence is not absolutely definitive. The famous American
JO
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philosopher William James considered the type of situation in which
the Cliffordian fear of error is neither practical nor possible. James
speaks of decisions about what to believe which are (in his words)
"living," "momentous," and "forced." For James, as well as for a
great many people, decisions about religious beliefs are precisely of
this sort. They present us with situations in which we cannot avoid
some kind of decision, and hence cannot protect ourselves from risk.
It does not matter which way we believe - we risk falling into error
and also risk losing the truth.
Having drawn up a scenario in which a decision about belief is
living, momentous, and forced - and yet in which the evidence is not
conclusive either way -we can now understand why the duty to seek
truth might take priority over the duty to avoid error. This may well
be the kind of situation in which many religious believers find
themselves, and hence their choice to believe in God is not only
understandable, but justifiable. A bout the only qualification on such
a choice is that the person involved responsibly consider the evidence
and the alternatives, and that the evidence be in some way adequate
for the decision. But the rigid Cliffordian standard is quite useless in
these situations. So, according to a more complete ethics for
believing - an ethics which includes a duty to find truth - a person's
decision to believe in God may be entirely compatible with his
epistemic duties.
IV. Rationality and the Available Evidence (second criticism)

A. The Need for Evidence
We have just been considering a criticism of religious belief which
focuses on the relationship between a believer and the belief that he
holds. There is a second, but related, criticism which focuses on the
relationship between the belief held and the evidence for or against it.
Most philosophers say that any proposition which is believed must
be based on appropriate evidence. The actual evidence, then, is the
ultimate court of appeal, regardless of how conscientiously one
reviews it. Just as a person can be criticized for not going through the
proper process of forming a belief, the belief itself can be criticized
for not measuring up to the evidence.
This second type of criticism is the one we now want to examine
with respect to religious belief. The critic may say either that belief in
God is not supported by available evidence or that it is straightll
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forwardly falsified by the evidence. This kind of criticism is fairly
common in the history of philosophy. The brilliant British
philosopher, Bertrand Russell, was once asked what he would say if,
after dying, he were brought into the presence of God and asked why
he had not been a believer. According to Russell, "I'd say, 'Not
enough evidence God! Not enough evidence'!" I suppose that each of
us could have some fun speculating how such a reply would be
received! But Russell held, as many people have, that belief in God is
irrational because there is insufficient evidence for it. Let us explore
this criticism a little further.

B. What Is It for a Belief to Have Evidence?
Just what is it for a belief to have evidence or grounds? For our
purposes, it is for one proposition, namely, the belief, to be justified
by one or more other propositions. These other propositions already
have some favored status in one's thinking and hence can be used to
guage or measure the acceptability of other propositions. To cite
proposition Bas evidence for proposition A, then, is to indicate that
one believes A on the basis of B, which he already believed. As an
example, consider two propositions which provide evidence for a
third.
(I) John is a Hoosier, and (2) Nine out of ten Hoosiers can play
basketball. Thus, supply evidence for the proposition. (3) Probably,
John can play basketball.
Evidence, as we now see, is simply some propositions offered to
support other propositions. It is irrational to believe any proposition
for which there are no pre-propositions which can be offered as a
proper support.

C. Evidence and Foundationalism
As we continue to think about some propositions supporting
others, we may ask whether the supporting propositions in turn have
support, i.e., whether the evidence itself has evidence. Of course, this
is a legitimate question. Many philosophers say this is exactly how
knowledge and belief is structured - that there is a series of
propositions in which each one is supported by others. In terms of
our previous example, the proposition (I) John is a Hoosier, which
served as evidence, may, in turn, rest on the propositions, (4) John
filed an Indiana tax return last year, (5) John cheers for Indiana
University sports, and (6) John frequently hums "Back Home Again
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in Indiana." These last three propositions now serve as evidence for
the preceding one; and each of these three could rest on further
propositions, and so on.
However, a number of philosophers think we cannot just keep
citing evidence for evidence for evidence indefinitely. As these
philosophers see it, the process of citing some propositions to
support others must come to an end. We must come to certain
propositions for which there is no further evidence. Presumably,
these propositions will be the most general, most basic, and most
important propositions that all mankind believes. Although
philosophers have differed somewhat over which and how many
propositions form the foundations of human knowledge, there is
much common agreement. The proposed list of such propositions
frequently includes: the beliefs that self exists, other persons exist,
material objects exist, there has been a past, etc. Such special
propositions have been called the/oundations ofknowledge; and the
philosophers who view knowledge in this way are called f oundationalists. Philosophers who seem to hold some form of foundationalism include Aristotle, Aquinas, Thomas Reid, and G.E.
Moore; I am also inclined to interpret Clifford as some sort of
foundationalist.
When we adopt afoundationalist view of knowledge and envision
the rest of our beliefs somehow resting upon a secure basis, we can see
that no talk of evidence is complete unless it includes one's total set of
beliefs reaching all the way down into the foundational beliefs he
holds. When we ask about the evidence for or against a proposition,
we ultimately want to know how that proposition fares with respect
to all of the relevant propositions in one's storehouse of beliefs and
not just with regard to a select few. Belief in a proposition would truly
be irrational, we should think, if it did not square with the total
evidence available in our set of beliefs.

D. Another Indictment of Religious Belief
It is now easy to see how a critic might use foundationalist thinking
to say that religious belief is irrational. He might not want to bother
with the weaker criticism that belief in God is disconfirmed by some
beliefs in our noetic structure. Instead he might advance the stronger
criticism that belief in God is disconfirmed by our total set of beliefs,
or at least by the balance of our beliefs. But more pointedly, belief in
God is unacceptable in light of the foundational beliefs we hold.
13
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V. Is Religious Belief Contrary to Available Evidence? (second reply)

A. Giving the Critic His Due - Again
The criticism that religious belief is irrational became it does not
have support by our overall structure of knowledge cannot be easily
dismissed. In fact, there are a number of considerations which force
us to take the criticism seriously. For one, the whole idea of belief
having foundations is an attractive and often helpful theory. For
another thing, it seems true that some religious believers cite weak or
irrelevant evidence for their belief in God, making it appear perhaps
that there is no better justification. However, the persistent critic will
probably not be satisfied with only this mere concession.

B. F oundationalism and Atheism
The zealous critic will want to state his charge in the strongest
possible way: that the foundational propositions on which all other
human beliefs rest entail that God does not exist. The contemporary
philosopher, Antony Flew, makes this point in his treatise, The
Presumption of Atheism. Flew thinks that the common and normal
belief structure of mankind is such that it discredits belief in God.
Hence, belief in God is irrational. Since the presumption, according
to Flew, is in favor of atheism, the heavy burden of proving God's
existence rests squarely upon the shoulders of the believer.

C. Difficulties with Foundationalism
The question of whether the atheistic proposition "God does not
exist" is included in or implied by the foundations of human belief
meets with several difficulties. These difficulties are best understood
as specific instances of larger and more general difficulties with
foundationalism itself. To begin, there is a problem in specifying
exactly which propositions are properly incorporated into the
foundations. There is certainly no unanimous agreement about these
propositions, and there is clearly no accepted criterion whereby we
can detect the right propositions. There are some rough guidelines, to
be sure: We suppose these basic beliefs to be relatively few in number,
to be entailed by all or some of our other subsidiary beliefs, and so
forth. But beyond this, nothing seems very definite.
Now the critic needs for the foundations to be very clear for his
accusation to stick. He needs to be able to say that the proposition
that God does not exist is in the foundations, or at least that it can be
14
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deduced from foundational propositions. But as long as different
people might have important disagreements regarding the
propositions which they count as basic, the critic cannot move so
unilaterally against religious belief. According to the foundations of
some people's beliefs, belief in God may be perfectly legitimate.
Admittedly, according to the foundational beliefs of other people
(e.g., Flew) belief in God may be ruled out. But this fact about the
differences in what we count as basic is merely biographical
information and not grounds for saying that belief in God is
irrational with respect to the foundations of human knowledge.

D. God and Foundationalism
We have shown that there is no necessary reason to think belief
that God does not exist is in the foundations of human knowledge.
Now what can we say about whether the belief that God does exist is
in the foundations? It appears that we must say that belief in God is
not included in the foundations any more than it is excluded from
them. As far as a typical list of our most basic beliefs goes, neither
belief nor disbelief is necessitated. While this may at first sound a bit
unsettling to the devout believer, I think that it is really more faithful
to the Christian picture of how people come to belief in God.
Granted, the Bible says that all men somehow have a consciousness
of God or a belief in God. But it does not give us a philosophical
analysis of whether this belief is foundational in the technical sense
with which we are concerned.
For a proposition to be foundational, we must remember, it can
serve as evidence for other propositions, but it is accepted without
evidence. There are clear biblical passages which intimate that there
are various evidences for God's existence, and which men may
recognize if they will. These passages can readily be interpreted by
the categories we have been using. To say that there is evidence for
God's existence is to say that certain propositions about ourselves,
the world, and so forth - together with our foundational beliefs provided support for believing that God exists. This puts the
Christian in the position of having to consider those evidences and
recommend them to others. Belief in God, then, just like disbelief in
God, cannot simply be a presumption or assumption for which we
need have no evidence. But this means that belief in God is not in the
foundations.
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E. The Tradition of Natural Theology
So far, we have shown that belief in God is not irrational and that
this belief is subject to evaluation by both favorable and unfavorable
evidence. But we could press on to argue that belief in God is
positively rational, that it is in fact confirmed by the evidence. A
great many religious believers cite various evidences to support their
position: that the world must have had a cause; that someone had to
design the complex and orderly universe we have; that they have had
a personal experience with the transcendent source of all creation;
and so forth. Moreover, there is an inveterate tradition which has
sharpened and sophisticated these kinds of arguments so that even
the best of minds have had to take notice. This is the tradition of
natural theology. The Time magazine story cited earlier follows the
continuing attempts made by Christian philosophers to give rational
support to religious belief.
Now I am not insinuating that such arguments and evidence
compel just anyone and everyone who considers them to accept belief
in God. No argument in any area oflife (religion or otherwise) can do
this. Neither am I pretending that there are no arguments and
evidences brought against belief in God by thinking persons. There is
the problem of evil in the world, the problem of the meaning and
verification of theological language, and other arguments which
seem to support disbelief.
What I am claiming is the arguments and evidences which thinking
believers have developed certainly prevent the critic from stating that
religious belief is outright irrational according to the evidence. The
state of the debate over God's existence is just not that simple. All
thinking people must sift and weigh the evidence for themselves.
What thinking believers have done is to point out the legitimacy of
sorting out the evidence to support belief in God. Hence, their efforts
give us a clear right to say that belief in God's existence is rational.
VI. Vindication of Christian Belief (conclusion)
In closing, what shall we say in response to the primary question
which constitutes the title of this paper? Is Christian belief rational?
Of course, what we have done here is to look at only one aspect of this
complex question, but a very fundamental aspect at that: Is belief in
God's existence rational? We have seen what philosophers are saying
about the rationality of any belief in general and about religious
belief in particular.
16

Is Christian Belief Rational? What the Philosophers Are Saying
We have discovered the accusation that belief in God is irrational
has force only when arbitrary or impossible standards of rationality
are employed. Under close analysis, we find the most familiar
standards of rationality are not capable of being captured in precise
formulas. We have found religious belief fares reasonably well on the
incomplete but important criteria of rationality that we do have. We
have reaffirmed - with some new appreciation - a number of
believers abide by a general ethic of ration< 1ity and provide
impressive evidence for their religious position.
Therefore, I offer an answer to our initial question. There is no
necessary reason to think that Christian belief - in so far as it rests
on belief in God - is irrational. Instead, there are good grounds for
claiming that it is indeed rational.
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